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'ASIA'S
CAULDRON'
Finnian Bunta
This essay was originally submitted to POLS 348: International Organization & Law with Dr. Chad Mc-
Cracken in December of 2016. The topic of this essay is the legal disputes of the South China Sea, written 
from the persepctive of someone outside the IREL major. The title is a reference to Robert Kaplan's book.
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Class of 2018
The South China Sea sees billions worth of commercial products cross its waters every day, “Roughly two thirds of South 
Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 percent 
of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 
80 percent of China’s crude oil imports come 
through the South China Sea” (Kaplan 2015). 
Bordered by seven distinct nations (including 
Taiwan), these waters are divided by a plethoric 
maze of overlapping claims of sovereignty 
dating back to the 1970’s. It was then that the 
seven bordering nations laid anchor in what 
would become the most hotly contested sea 
in the world. In 1988, Chinese naval forces 
gunned down sixty-four Vietnamese soldiers 
defending a small disputed reef in the Spratly 
Islands.  This archipelago lies in a strategic 
trading highway and its mere 14 islands are 
bitterly fought over by China, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Vietnam, and Taiwan. Why are people dying 
over a spit of beach in the middle of the ocean? 
For one, China estimates 125 billion barrels of 
oil beneath the sea floor of the region, which 
would be the second largest reserve in the world 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration n.d.). 
Malaysia and Vietnam have been propped up 
by the United States, firmly entrenching U.S. 
economic interests and dictating U.S. response 
to Chinese aggression. The globe’s lonely two 
superpowers are preparing their fleets for the 
inevitable confrontation that lies on the open sea. 
Already, Chinese vessels were taped harassing 
and blockading the US Navy ship Impeccable 
in 2009, which led to secretary of state Hillary 
Clinton boldly stating that the United States 
has a “national security” interest in the South 
China Sea (“The South China Sea” 2016). 
Despite decisive American rhetoric that the 
Sea is endowed with freedom of navigation by 
international law, the Chinese have maintained 
a course of assertive expansion illustrated by 
the ongoing construction of artificial military 
island bases and oil rigs in Vietnamese and 
Malaysian claimed waters. The United States 
and the international community as a whole is 
desperate for a resolution. International law can 
deliver that.
 I will draw three legal conclusions from the issue at 
hand. One, The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims 
“historic water” sovereignty to the region falling within 
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the “nine dash line” territory as denoted in Figure 1. I 
will consider the legal criteria necessary to validate this 
claim and whether the PRC have met this threshold. Two, 
the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea governed by 
Part IX of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOS), which prompts countries bordering such 
seas to “co-operate with each other.” I will demonstrate 
if the efforts of the PRC, Vietnam, and the other coastal 
nations to comply with this international standard have 
been satisfactory. Three, I will consider the American 
claim for freedom of navigation in the Sea, especially the 
legal credibility the maritime giant possesses as a non-
signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention.
 While pouring over a recent Chinese-made world 
map, one would clearly observe a bold nine-dash line that 
loops down into the blue waters off the coast of China’s 
southernmost seaside. Since the nationalist government 
of the PRC came to power in 1947, this U-shaped series 
of lines delineated its maritime claim in the South 
China Sea. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOS) grants littoral states an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) as far as 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. 
However, the ICJ created an exception to that guarantee 
in Fisheries Jurisdiction case that would overturn the LOS 
EEZ provision if the following criteria are established, 
generating a “historic water”—(1) the exercise of authority 
over the area by the state claiming the historic right; (2) 
the continuity of this authority for a considerable duration; 
[and] (3) the recognition of other states of this authority 
(World Courts 1974). The third criterion stands out as the 
most contentious, many scholars hold recognition to mean 
utter acceptance by, while many believe acquiescence to 
be sufficient. Moreover, the claim of “historic water” is 
different than a “historic right” in that sovereignty over 
disputed territory cannot be claimed with a “historic right” 
claim (Leonardo 2012). Therefore, a region needs to be 
declared a “historical water” to strip another nation of its 
200 nm EEZ guaranteed by UNCLOS as China seeks to 
do to the adjacent states in the South China Sea.
 Chinese legal scholars seek to affirm the first element 
of “historic water” declaration, the exercise of authority, 
by tracing back records to as early as the Han Dynasty 
(r. 206 BC to 220 AD).  Furthermore, evidence exists 
that the Song dynasty (960-1276) had given specific 
names to various islands and incorporated them under 
the administration of the modern Guangxi province. 
Chinese “naval patrols” further exhibit Chinese authority 
during this period, but Republican France and Imperial 
Japan boast evidence the PRC authority was expelled 
for significant durations. Following Japanese surrender 
of World War II, China reclaimed the “territory” it had 
ceded during the war, most notably the Spratly Islands. In 
December 1946, an acceptance ceremony was conducted 
on Itu Aba, the main island of the Spratly’s. Here, a 
memorial was erected to commemorate the Chinese 
troops that defended it during the war. This evidence of 
authority clearly places the Spratly’s in the back pocket of 
the Chinese does it not? The Chinese rolled into the South 
China Sea with navy destroyer vessels in the 1940’s while 
the six other littoral nations were shackled by primitive 
underdevelopment. Even if the first element of “historic 
waters” is realized, continuity and recognition of authority 
are required as well. We will examine those next.
 Legal weight is added to the “historic waters” 
claim from the Island of Palmas Case. After Spain 
ceded authority over the Philippines to the Americans in 
1898, the United States claimed the historic rights of an 
island off the shore of Indonesia where the Spanish had 
allegedly possessed authority. However, the Dutch had 
asserted sovereignty on the island through a collection of 
treaties with native Princes. While the Dutch recognized 
the internal administration of the local Princes, conversely 
the local Princes withheld direct relations from any other 
foreign powers, including Spain. Dutch currency, Dutch 
flags, tax records to the Dutch, the Dutch coat of Arms 
on official documents, and even Dutch naval patrols 
provide concrete evidence of actual authority. Thus, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration held that the Dutch had 
exercised, “open and public... continuous and peaceful 
display of State authority” (United Nations 2006). This 
example highlights that the actual display of authority 
over a territory is essential to claim sovereignty. Despite 
Spanish maps indicating that the island was under their 
control, international law deemed that the colonial empire 
possessed no true authority of the island. Considering this 
legal precedent, the Chinese claim to all of the islands 
within the nine-dash line is severely weakened. While 
Chinese cartography has depicted the islands exclusively 
under their dominion, the facts on the ground do not 
demonstrate sole possession as the Dutch did in Island 
of Palmas Case. Exclusivity is an integral piece China 
is lacking in their legal claim which spells unequivocal 
failure to meet the continuity or acceptance requirements 
of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case. 
 Transitioning to the second major legal dispute of the 
South China Sea, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOS) has been deemed the constitution 
on territorial waters. Despite the United States’ failure to 
ratify the document, the multinational agreement reflects 
customary law because its provisions are adhered to 
virtually uniformly by all states and these states comply 
purely based on legal rationale. Part IX, titled Enclosed or 
Semi-Enclosed Seas, is a fundamental international law 
currently violated by all of the South China Sea nations. 
Article 123 of LOS writes, “States bordering an enclosed 
or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other... 
directly or through an appropriate regional organization” 
(United Nations 1982). COBSEA and PEMSEA are the 
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two unsuccessful attempts at regional organization, and 
neither is effective enough to satisfy the standard this 
law requires. The Coordinating Body on the Seas of East 
Asia (COBSEA) is an environmental action plan with 
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore as some of the participating states. However, 
over the past fifteen years the organization has faced 
insurmountable financial issues (Adler 2011). COBSEA 
was funded by UNEP, but in 2006 it was cut off. Now 
interest by participating states has dwindled, resulting 
in an utter absence of any organization managing the 
fisheries in the South China Sea. PEMSEA is another 
regional organization with China, Vietnam, Philippines 
other bordering states; however, it was legally separated 
from the United Nations Development Program in 2010. 
Since the split, PEMSEA has competed with COBSEA 
for funding and professional expertise as it seeks to serve 
an identical function. By the legal standard of LOS, this 
is unacceptable. The United Nations ought to combine the 
international entities, restore financial support, and carve 
out a strong legal personality for this new entity founded 
upon Article 123 of LOS. This rebranded regional body 
should possess the legal capacity to hold states accountable 
for international law wrongdoings, such as the collision 
between the US surveillance plane and Chinese jet 
fighter in 2001 or the Impeccable incident in 2009. The 
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) provides a valuable framework for the South 
China Sea nations to imitate. This regional organization 
includes twelve member states aimed at fostering 
multilateral political and economic cooperation around 
another enclosed body of water. Following the BSEC 
Charter in 1999, the organization gained full-fledged 
legal identity becoming a key mediator of international 
disputes. Moreover, the BSEC obtained the status of 
observer in the UN General Assembly. This facilitated 
multiple agreements between the organization and UNEP 
and UNDP, strengthening the financial security, political 
ties, and international legal capacity of BSEC (BSEC 
n.d.). The South China Sea region desperately needs an 
organization of this nature, and it is certainly achievable 
under current international law.
 Third, freedom of navigation on the open seas is 
staunchly preserved by the United States, but curiously 
enough, the Western superpower has not ratified the Law 
of the Sea Convention. The United States is a leading 
maritime power with the largest exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) and one of the longest continental shelves, but 
refuses to ratify a treaty to legally protect these holdings 
of sovereignty. However, much of the treaty has become 
(or already was) customary law due to the United States 
strict legal obedience and virtual uniform practice. Over 
the past two decades the American government has 
proactively challenged “excessive maritime claims” made 
by littoral states that are inconsistent with this treaty. In 
particular, the United States does not recognize claims by 
states that affect freedom of navigation or violate EEZ’s. 
For instance, the Impeccable incident occurred in Chinese 
territorial waters was protested by the Chinese as an 
illegal operation in its EEZ. However, the United States 
responded that “innocent passage” has been protected by 
customary international law long before the LOS treaty 
was created (Steven 2011). This example demonstrates 
how the United States has been able to enforce the 
freedom of navigation legal standard without ratifying 
the very treaty that crystalized the “innocent passage” 
position. The fact that the United States has not ratified 
the treaty does not indicate the rule has not become law, 
but should the United States be able to police states to 
adhere to a treaty that it did not agree to? In July of 2010, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a speech 
stating that all bordering states of the South China Sea 
should, “clarify their claims... consistent with customary 
international law, including as reflected in the Law of the 
Sea Convention” (Clinton, 2011). This example illustrates 
that the United States does believe it possesses the legal 
capacity to do so. Yet despite the conviction Clinton 
portrayed, the United States has seen no end to the 
territorial disputes as she called for. The essential question 
approaches, would ratifying the LOS enhance the legal 
credibility of the United States to police the South China 
Sea nations? Thus, is customary law intrinsically weaker 
than treaty law in this case? 
 Ronald Reagan put it best when he, as sitting US 
president, struck down ratification of the Law of the Sea 
Convention in 1983, “the United States is prepared to 
accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests 
relating to traditional uses of the oceans... as reflected in 
the Convention” (Reagan 1983). This example highlights 
the importance of legal rationale (opinio juris) in the 
creation of customary law. The United States believed 
freedom of navigation to possess legal rationale even 
before the Convention was signed into treaty. Furthermore, 
the United States founded the Freedom of Navigation 
Program to protect the legal provisions of the LOS, “The 
effectiveness of the FON program as a means to gain 
full coastal state compliance with the navigation and 
overflight provisions of the Convention has been positive. 
It has clearly and convincingly demonstrated to the 
international community that the U.S. will not acquiesce 
in excessive maritime claims. It has played a positive role 
in curbing non-conforming territorial sea, contiguous 
zone and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims and, 
arguably, has helped persuade states to bring some of 
their domestic laws into conformity with the Convention” 
(U.S. Department of Defense 1993, p. 83). This example 
further demonstrates the United States is endowed with 
the legal credibility to police South China Sea nations in 
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accordance with the LOS convention based on the equal 
footing of customary law to that of treaty law. There is no 
superiority between the two.
 I conclude that China does not possess an effectual 
“historic water” claim in the South China Sea due to the 
deficiency of exclusive authority based on the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction precedent. Second, COBSEA and PEMSEA 
can be combined in accordance to Article 123 of the 
LOS to create a regional body wielding legal personality 
similar to that BSEC. Lastly, the United States does not 
suffer any legal shortcomings by not ratifying the LOS 
convention, rather the key benchmark of opinio juris 
has been fulfilled, crystallizing freedom of navigation 
as a customary law on equal footing to that of the treaty 
law of the convention. As the South China Sea territorial 
disputes heat up with the potential passage of the TPP 
and President-elect Donald Trump’s interest in Taiwan’s 
independence, these three international legal arguments 
will be crucial to events unfolding in the region.
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